under the strong red cantilever

Zahalmuk Feoroem sez: "Humanity, at the dawn of the memetic era had to find a good metaphysical solution to the problem of one's eventual death. The Arrhengterrapongorin, those sensitive to primate mind gestalts (in religious and other contexts) discovered a rather interesting solution: three entities, in the same place at the time, both the same and not the same as each other, separated thronteareally. Occasionally context will become a little blurry between them, and this lets their thread move along. Humans, like the spongyll, use the three beings enter, seven entities leave method. These beings aren't gods, or some mythical scientific phantagasmoria of symbolics and jargon, nor are they the creature's eigenparents. They are Urukpu. Let me give you an example.

The human being Acaurkon Kelmethides living on the world Thyrpok in the fourth era of Bleymungo's internal context looked (on the inside) the same as that of the bipediform Cohoquaia Lyriscuna of the Parunthero Conurbation beyond the Mairtends of Gulguvel, and it looked the same as that of anthropomon Mehetaia Arbunguns from the Chytheramon Palligevrem adhambent of the Niolane Shelfwhorl. All three are undergoing their particular transspecies' death rituals in the external context. In their internal context however, the one that's important, this happens:

They enter a seven sided room. The walls are glittering, glistening, alive. They might look like tiny polygons with many eyes. Or Thaiahangue. Or tombrils. They make eye contact.  That's the moment.

If your method of producing new imaginary people involves a weeding process through probability space, then you are no better than a genocidist.

Acaurkon Balpalangor Kelmethides, Cohoquaia Ujimier Lyriscuna, and Mehetaia Tanungo Arbunguns enter the Raum and begin transpongilating. Each one of them knows the refrain: "moi fuau, transpongilation, borteldacking", which might be, in some other languages "wake up, be alive, sleep". But now there is no need to moi fuau or borteldack, and it's total transpongilation. It makes physical sex by biological identifying primates look rather dessicated in comparison, and it happens every moment of their lives. And it's something that you can imagine. Their memomes interfruct, transfringling, transquilateralizing, interfrulating,  And this doesn't just happen at their death, per se, but every single instant of their lives. It taxes the visual imagination like you would not believe. And every instant of everyone's life, both in the imaginary and the real: you get three people who see the same thing from three different points of view, and you just another frond of human experience.

The first transpongilation, before a little break for tea and cheese, when their  eigenfrost is still slow, produces:
Acauquaialryataia Balhoquo Arbungethides,
Lyriscunkon Tunungjai Cohoquagun,
Behengpelom Palanagissku Kelmiscunguns,
Mehekonu Caurmier Lyriscunguns
Kelmetahiu Bulpelega Acarguthides
Acohoa Balbenam Ruhungpe
Lyrispalangai Mehelgnam Quayhoi



And why need there be one absolute being? The epicenter of religious belief is in that there is only *one* absolute human. There isn't. Each one of us is comprised of the extant snapshots of numerous intertranspongilations of many potential people, but some alien imaginaries are more recognizable as ourselves then anything proximate to us. We sing to them, and they sing to us, for we hear their existence ringing, even across the uncrossable boundary of the imaginary.

One consequence of this point of view of the Arrhengterrapongorin is that for every three people, there is an entire world where everyone resembles all of us. And this shouldn't be taken that there are an absolute three people either, because you iterate the process. There's nothing special about 3 and 7, except that they are primes the Arrhengterrapongorin happen to be fond of. The Talbudarin are fond of 31 and 41, and the Palphimattio prefer 17 and 6701. We're a simple transcendental peoplage. Hi!"

You may recognize this slogan:

Disputation of Kiri-Kin-Tha's first Law of Metaphysics

Pahaerallungte Nahallongis sez:

Kiri-Kin-Tha's first law is "Nothing unreal exists". Platonically, this is wrong, but you shouldn't go running to Plato for primitive (and thoroughly flawed) discourse on the ideal and the real. The context which Terrecences first encounter this law on a movie screen is rather delightful irony: the planet Vulcan does not exist, yet it is real.

There are many perfectly consistent worlds which are imaginaries, but because of the way the WSOGMM is strobed for you, these worlds are urukpu: the real (though nonexistent) imaginary. This quality of being interimaginary is commutative. What is urukpu for me, I may be urukpu to it.  There are four sorts of urukpu, generally:

*urukpu apulanai: this is urukpu that can be constructed, drawn out of the imaginary by the distillation of creative energies.
*urukpu thyrrine: this is urukpu that cannot be brought locally: people, nations, actual worlds
*urukpu cypongbaia: this is urukpu that calls to each other. the distant and ethereal references that transcend the indranet, of interimaginaries with a fondness for each other, as if some effervescent limit set of the cosmic mobius inversion refers one thing to another.
*urukpu altahyra: this is urukpu that is unseeable, perfectly consistent other cosmai, all mapped to sunyata locally
*urukpu ayarghu: this is urukpu which is more proximal (say by the thronteareal measure of interimaginaries)
*urukpu storgossil: this is urukpu which is distal (farther away)

There are some things which actually don't exist, even after you topologize the interimaginaries across all strobings of the WSOGMM. These are the undeserved imaginaries. They are called yuhugorhue. (of course, nobody wants yuhugorhue, and some entities can't readily distinguish between yuhugorhue and urukpu).

The Julmun Taxonomy classifies different sorts of entities based on their relationship to the transcendental transformations which the cosmos doesn't actually go through.

The Opai are constantly arriving. One becomes Opai.
The Bravy are those who are departing, or forgetting. One forgets that one is Bravy.
The Toht are those who are neither Opai nor Bravy nor not Opai nor not Bravy.

The Honoy are those who aren't there. And don't fit into the above three categories.
They may have bright eyes, but they're already gone.

The essence of elegant creativity is to find urukpu apulanai and bring it into existence

The Mruhabin Essay on Wetness

(this essay was originally published in the Parg Hassuck Papers, Volume 12, Edition 15. It was written by Palbahu Mruhabin of 45 Yelorbit Point, New Kervurulum, Baranessia, and may be distributed without regard to ontology -- it may be distributed to any and all interimaginaries)

Wetness is desirable, but what is wetness? Boiling water, for instance, is not wet. Nor is freezing water. Nor are fish wet while they are in the sea. Water that is too hot or too cold is not wet. Allusions to wetness exist in various citrus scents, and in mints occasionally, and in other scents. It is a quality which various coruscations of non-water soluble scents may carry, but only in the right quantities. Organic things are more wet than inorganic things. Ozone alludes to wetness, perhaps more than geosmin as it ramifies into petrichor. Certain phonemes are wetter than others, for instance the 'L' phoneme is arguably wetter than the 'W' phoneme. A scuttled ship on the floor of the sea is not wet, continuing to riff on the concept that wetness is involved in the transition from the immersion in water. A post in water, perhaps part of a pier that is continually on the border between the air and the water is waterlogged, but wetness is about the perception of water, and there is a certain dryness involved in not fully being able to make the transition.
Wetness is about change, solubility, transfiguration between one thing and another: stalled change does not change make. Mist is wetter than steam. Wetness warbles. It is Perehune Amalgastaro's contention that the essence of the concept of the water elemental is not the physical act of wetting nor is it oceanic continua of water, but the abstract sensory qualia of wetness that is distributed amongst a wide variety of experiences.

For instance, some sounds are wetter than others, and some are drier. The mind is hungry for wet sounds and wet experiences as dessication and calcification are the harbingers of extinction. Dendrous trees are wetter than collections of sticklike trees. Red is not a very wet color, though combinations of green and orange can be wet. Wet light is more appealing than dry light: the distinction transcends the warm/cool color distinction. Wet light has a greater ultraviolet component in it. Wetness is about effervescence, fluorescence, fluidity. Phosphorescence by itself is rather dry. Chemiluminescence may be wet under certain circumstances. Wetness is a quality that transcends water.

Blavourag handed sandwiches and milkshakes around. Hehengue and Corsilidor took them.
"We may not actually exist", Blavourag said, casually. "But that might not actually be a problem."
Hehengue and Corsilidor exchanged quizzical glances with Blavourag.

Blavourag continued, enjoying a tupperware milkshake. "So, either you've got religions with some method of ascribing cosmic import to the ways that humans arise and are extinguished, or you've got spiritual systems hazily recommending methods for personal development in an epistemologically ambiguous universe. The religions have some eigenpeople manifest in belief structures which are ramified across the muscular stress spectra of the humans who believe them. Desire gets rather convoluted, burnished and cantilevered and with escarpments of subrational fears which are never properly appraised because there's no real way of addressing them in a declarative context. Utterly nonsensate fear. Are you with me so far?"

Hehengue munched on a prepositional phrase, while Corsilidor chewed on a tinnet. They muttered assent and Blavourag continued. "Take for instance Elemyuril's fifth fundamental male fear, the fear that one is inert and unalive because one cannot produce life inside oneself, you two know that one, right?"

Hehengue nodded. Corsilidor looked puzzled, did a data chirp, then nodded. "That's a terrifying one, but at least it's nameable and one can palpate it with reason", sez Corsilidor, digesting the data chirp.

Blavourag: "Because fundamental fears do weird things to life topologies, people confuse death with birth. It really relates a lot to how changeable the self is, or how changeable the self feels. If someone is so rigid and there aren't processes extant to flush a lot of tension in the stress muscularome away in a relatively ordered fashion to reduce the energy level, then there are going to be a lot of rather chaotic jumps down. A lot of phony intellectual systems get created and people lose track of things."

Corsilidor looked through the chirp again. "Palarqai's fourteenth fundamental fear is somewhat hilarious"

Blavourag nodded. "The fear of dying illogically -- yeah, some things are actually impossible, and unfortunately people's imaginations are not architected to work logically, and the more knowledge and creativity that's around, the more ornate these fears get. Corso, look at Pellemongis's eighteenth fundamental fear"

Corsilidor laughed. "The fear of brain material, or the fear that one is only brain material, or the fear of shriveling brains, or shriveled and hardened flesh, and also of folds of glutinous fluid condensing. I don't suppose they know how the development of the neural tube gets encoded in one's fear set  do they?"

Blavourag winced: "Actually we know exactly how that encoding process takes shape. Eiurhel Lyrismue did the work some five nahambes ago. The takeaway is that all of these fears are usually nameless because people don't think about them intensely, and that's not surprising, because people don't want to think of them. They grow, accrete, and higher order fears with more declarative reason get layered on top of them, with calls from the higher order fears to the lower order fears."

Hehengue asks "so what next?"

Blavourag replies: "We know much about the bioanatomy of religious gestalts, the model of the perfect human and the comparison of that model against other living people. Arumele produced very precise microanatomies of some religious gestalts. They're abysmal things, really. But spiritual systems are on the whole worse, because they don't really have a focal depth, and there are a lot of intellectually inconsistent and unverifiable propositions they make about arbitraries, which gives them an inauthentic feel to them. People get stuck philosophizing and it's like quicksand, not really a very effective approach. "

Hehengue interjects: "Mysticism without mystification?"

Blavourag nods vigorously: "Exactly: the notion that there's a type of information that would be useful to you but cannot be communicated in a declarative format. Mhunaro's old joke about the dudes with a classical and quantum computers works. Do you know it?"

Hehengue shrugs. Corsilidor again looks puzzled. Blavourag tells it:

"Aitaraung: Hey, Mjohotu, I hear you have some information for me. I've got some free storage space.
Mjohotu: I do. About two hundred gigaqubytes. Do you have the ability to recieve and store quantum data?
Aitaraung: No, all I have is about four terabytes of classical storage space.
Mjohotu: That will not be a problem. Though you're going to find the data a bit weird.
Aitaraung: I don't understand. What do you mean, a bit weird?
Mjohutu: Well, there *is* something I can do that will give you all two hundred gigaqubytes, but you're going to be overwhelmed by it.
Aitaraung: what do you mea.... oh holy phong shading. What did you do..."

Blavourag continues: "The real question here, is not how to eradicate fears and defix the self, those should be trivial to you now. The real question is in fact, how to produce an intellectually flexible and correct schema for mystical experience that addresses the religious and scientific fallacies precisely and unambiguously. Both of them are too viscous and rigidifying for anyone's own good.

Religions produce the /Everyone-All-Alike/ which slows evolution down and creates a template for the human conditon. This is terrifying, but it's illusory, so to speak. Science produces the notion of an epistemology that champions a very normative epistemological view about the world, taken to its limits it produces atheism. Both views have rather serious flaws. Seeing past those flaws requires not the suspension of disbelief or the suspension of belief, but very precise analysis of one's epistemological bulwarks. Spiritual systems suffer from incoherence. What else am I missing?"

Hehengue sez: "transquilateralization. You said we may not exist?"

Blavourag replies: "But it doesn't matter if we don't, because we're neither here nor there. And if you try to explain our, um, ontological position to the humans, you're going to get very confused looks by anyone. There are some consistent imaginaries which are complete and inaccessible to them because that's not the way their universe works. As elegant and effervescent as we are, because of the way that the humans relate to the world, we are forever in the kernel of ethereal nothingness to them, always mapped to zero because the sensory qualia our coruscations belie does not riff on their home context in a way which is extant to them: we do not consign this to the limitations of their data storage methods or memories or sensory qualia."

Hehengue sez: "Okay, let me get this crooked: whatever epistemological dance we're doing, and/or whatever ontological dance we're doing, it doesn't actually get mapped onto any explicit human categorization or ontological class. The moment we get the slightest bit of information to them, they don't know what to make of it, so they clad it in their fears, most of the time. And, if I'm not mistaken, we do occasionally have some successes."

Blavourag grins: "Exactly. If our signal is correctly interpreted they realize why we're broadcasting a hard Epimenides paradox, and the resolution of that paradox alliterates over them. How else do you transmit across the boundary of a one sided interimaginary(1), anyway? The hopes and fears are signals into the imaginary, and imagined things is the signal in return. If you transmit to things like you, you are going to get signals from things like you. If you transmit to things that are different than you, or that do not exist and perhaps explicitly know it, maybe you're going to get better data? Not all nonexistent things are that pleasant. "

Corsilidor looked at the green dendrous toroids circling the sun-dragon, five imaginaries orange of Ohio.