whereas the epistemological noise

To say that something exists is more than declaring its name or what type of thing it is. "There exists an X such that:" declares the type of x, and does little more than to propel a named object into one's scope. It's a Western type of statement, and presupposes a flat and drab kind of nonexistence. Mathematics took the first step by the synthesis of categories, but it has to go further, and the place to start with is categories, or more generally speaking the fundamental abstraction, whether sets, string-manipulation rules, formal systems, functions, sets, categories, you name it, we have a method of apprehending it. Fundamentals questions become ascendancy questions about ascendancy and primacy become and are subject to the ebb and flow of history.

And thus there's an ever growing jungle of metaphors and abstractions. In Saunders MacLane's Categories for a Working Mathematician, he says something along the lines that Kan extensions subsume all other metaphors, and I wonder if those reaching that point of the book get a little misty eyed and angry. It's akin to saying that you've got the answer to the question "what is?", intransitively. "What is?" "What exists?" "Who is?", and such intransitive questions leave you wanting some kind of conclusive network terminus, a node that envelops all other nodes. Such a thing does not exist in the way that you usually concieve of existence.

In category theory, the key bit to grasp is that the objects of categories aren't fundamental, but byproducts of the links. An object is said to exist within a given context if and only if there are relations between that object and objects already within that context. Whatever kind of abstraction or metaphor that your particular place's location is working on, it's working with a certain flavor of reasoning on some specified kind of object, beyond which it is impossible to speculate about the internal properties of that object, because the abstraction barriers imposed by that particular flavor of reasoning prevent such speculation. Given a flavor of reasoning, and a fundamental abstraction, it is impossible to speak beyond that abstraction. Every flavor of reasoning is limited, because it has a context which is home to it. Beyond and outside of that context, one isn't able to reason, or speak of anything. Depending on the degree of intentionality of the casting of the particular net in question, and the degree to which the shore of the network drifts (the tide), there is a varying amount of information which analysis will be able to provide.

The honky tonk train of analysis, of religion, of biology, of any abstraction, of your faith, of your logic, will only take you so far. What it may give you is true, up to its network-inhabitancy. Beyond that, there are numerous and nonunique itineraries beyond. But those are in the Tumbolia, which is not apprisable by navigation. Objects will condense from tathata/Tumbolia and remain around for a time, then dissolve into the invisible torrent.

Of the unutterable and inexpressible, I can and cannot speak. We stand, looking for coherence outward. Coherence is the modern form of consistency. Whereas the old bugaboo was consistency, the new bugaboo is coherence. Every metaphor-perspective will have its bugaboo: it's "avoid this, it gives me a headache". The clarion trumpet calls "Consistency!", "Coherence!", "Conhedroncy"! and so forth and so on. For every system of reasoning, there exists an impassible mire where its capacities become like iridescent purple froth weaving on the wind. Category theory, lambda calculus, set theory, and so forth and so on. Each one of these particular metaphor systems, including the one which this argument is being presented, have a statement or idea or concept which within them is valid, but is not possible to reach using their internal languages/transformation schema. The drive here is that we seek the kind of mental objects/structures which are as portable as possible. The allure of portable mental objects is that they require less bullying to convince other people to concieve of them. It's their vivid consistency between their instances in separate people's minds which induces our concern with them. Likewise, we're turned off by non-portable mental objects: the ravings and beliefs of a lunatic, for instance, or of what we consider demented or idiotic people thumping their chests at us because we believe something they find inconsistent with their belief system. Anyone solidly on one or another side on such a debate is being inflexible.