telamon or broke

Speaking for the parties with no voices, perhaps askew expression begets badly strewn scallopscapes. Inexactitude is like the wind: the words are like lillies undergoing brachiation or some other kind of inexactly expressed idea. Today, I shall learn another script or another way of expression, but not really. No proper chalk chiaroscuro will suffice to express the idea currently ululating in my mind. It is like a smudged thought, that I desparately place upon some kind of window and then distractedly wander off, hoping that I will find someone who those thoughts will jive, will be heard appropriately and without confusion. That is my usual wish. Thus I engage myself in programmes of self-expression, but programmes of self expression without intended audiences: I speak to the void, not worrying about anyone specifically, I just let the words and phonemes pitter patter down. It's tiring, these gray doldrums. I've made a cozy little vortex my home. I'm familiar with its characteristic smoke fragments and extruded frustration vapor. I see occasional lampposts which are sharp and stark against this landscape, but they are also distant and hard to get a hold of. I wish they were nearer. I wish I didn't have to dredge the mines for such an interminably long time. I'm stuck in an archipelago by a strait next to an isthmus: I wander this grotto, fumingly: I see landmarks and broken ideas here. I don't feel like I'm a part of any tradition. I feel like I can hear the sounds of a massive wooden behemoth breaking and shattering into tiny pieces. People have gotten sloppy. Very sloppy. I suppose it's cyclical and given a sufficiently disintered observer in the curds and flotsam of human experience you could find patterns of sloppiness and nonsloppiness, but it looks like the current one is going to go on: that's the direction of the climate. And I believe the human species is far too early along its little wanderlust for anything like memetic climatology to be firmly developed to the point of consistency. Some people are creative and playful, but most are hacks. There's nothing wrong with hackery, but the problem is if everyone is a hack then you kind of get lost in a sea of approximations. Oh, we're satisfied with linear approximations because elliptic functions and hypergeometric functions scare the heebie-jeebies out of us. Oh, we're going to go with documents prepared with microsoft word and typeset in times new roman because it's what's out there, and we're not going to admit to knowing any better because we so clearly don't. And then this lot gets it into their head to complain about things that don't work or have changed without them knowing the specifics, or that the announcement of the change was placed in a disused lavatory at the bottom of the stairs with a sign saying "beware of the tiger". Wasn't Arthur Dent the one who didn't know how anything worked? (c.f. Mostly Harmless). And now there are an effectively innumerable number of Arthur Dents dentishly squishing their nose at the glass wondering why they keep being exposed to a deranged and chaotic universe which doesn't seem to possess once ounce of sympathy for them before, after, and during a series of misadventures with technology. The commonweal is too common. And most people are dimly aware of that. And they'll go and purchase incandescent lights and bad beds and complain about the same things over and over again. A lack of focus, it is, I think. I also believe that there is a lack of distactable perfectionism: people are either too narrowly focused or dead. And the dead are living: cavorting and zombily walking the earth, yapping on their cellphones. But enforced belief system injections are not the answer, and neither is appealing to the uncertainty of the universe. It's utterly foolish and completely irresponsible for anyone to say that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, or Hugh Everett's many worlds interpretation, or quantum physics, or Godel's Incompleteness theorems (or extensions thereof by Church, Turing, Chaitin, and others) are a clear sign that science has lost it. This is like treating science as if it was one thing, either a clear and victorious method of human epistemology free from issues, or a downright scoundrel determined to undermine humanity. It's one of those intrinsicist farragos which more pointless intellectual strife progresses as result. That minor point aside, it's the ad agencies, like the religious missionaries and proselytizers who stretch an improperly degranularized science as the princeps of human reasoning. Close parenthesis. The result of this simultaneous marketing of science and religion is a disaster.

It would be amazing if there was an epistemology which didn't have the faults of (the granularized) sciences or religious reasoning. It's know that both the process of understanding and comprehension cause opiates to be released in the brain. It's also know that religious processes in the human brain involve opiates as well. What is strange is that both processes are involved in the relief of pain. There is pain associated from not knowing? That section of the do reticulum necessarily cut off from one's perception by the individuality of a person under normal circumstances. So, harking back to my misguided attempt to define informed aesthetics in a previous post: I want to say that something whose aesthetics I consider informed has the following properties: it is unquestionably identifiable as a given object by its context. There is no ambiguity in determining what the thing is, and this is particularly important for single use physical objects. For multiple use physical objects, the object's ambiguity of scope of function should make it easy for the user to toggle their mental image of the functions of the object. The object should be designed such that the person who is using the object has little difficulty figuring out how to use it. For a given object there will be a relatively reliable way in which it relates to the person using it, and in most cases, I think that way should give the person using little thought about using the object. Such objects should also be easy for people to use in the sense that it should not be difficult for the particular person to go from two year old with a given sort of object to the state where their use of the object reflects precision and experience: objects should not be excessively hard to use. (I think I should find the essay about spimes).